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INDIAN OCEAN: THE "PEACE ZONE" PARADOX AND CHANCES FOR AREAS OF PEACE

Dieter Braun

I. Origins, definitions, and first clashes with reality

The term 'zone of peace' is sufficiently vague and imprecise to serve the most divergent political purposes. As 'peace', moreover, signifies a supreme moral/political value, neither individual nor state could straight-away oppose something that is being proclaimed in its name. The Soviet Union has made early and frequent political use of this quality. Thus Khrushchev, while taking up an old guide-line by Lenin about "the peoples of the East", demanded at the XX. party congress (1956) the creation of a peace zone, consisting of both the socialist camp and the newly emerging Asian and African states; this was the fore runner to later Soviet claims of being the partner in a 'natural alliance' with the Third World. Even earlier (in 1955), Nehru had equalled an 'area of peace' with the non-aligned countries between East and West; they should, by their equidistance, limit the dangers of war between the competing blocs[1]. This was the year of Bandung.

The non-aligned movement later took up Nehru's suggestion. A majority of its members, bordering the Indian Ocean, felt threatened in one way or the other by what they perceived, in the late sixties, as a new version of foreign domination. This was mainly related to the Anglo-American plan to make military use of Diego Garcia, and to the stationing of a Soviet naval contingent in the Indian Ocean. At the Lusaka summit (1970), the non-aligned passed a formal declaration on the Indian Ocean to be made a Peace Zone, "from which great power rivalries and competition, either Army, Navy, or Air Force bases, are excluded. The area should be free also of nuclear weapons".

At the time, there was great expectation in Asia and Africa that the United Nations could be converted into a powerful instrument of the powerless. This was the beginning of a Southern strategy towards the Northern industrial world, aiming at what later was to be called a New International

Economic Order, a revised international law of the sea, etc., in short a redress of basic asymmetries in the international system which continued to disadvantage the formerly colonized nations. Therefore, it seemed natural right after the Lusaka conference that the campaign for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ) was taken to the UN platform with its Third World voting bloc. There, in 1971, a resolution brought forward by Ceylon got a majority of votes which were substantially increased through the following years.

1971 was altogether a significant year in this respect. While it could be expected that the great powers and the main seafaring nations would be most reluctant to allow their rights of free use of any ocean - outside territorial waters - to be impeded by a collective vote of littoral states, it was China, new member of the UN and of its permanent Security Council, which backed the IOPZ in the world body. At the same time, the ASEAN members proposed (the 'Declaration of Kuala Lumpur') that South-East Asia should be recognized by the major powers, i.e. including China, as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Supporting this was the realization that the Vietnam war was drawing to an end and that the United States were in a process of retreat from the Asian mainland. Again in 1971, both Malaysia and Indonesia declared relevant parts of the Malacca Straits their national waterway, with Singapore distancing itself; this move heightened the sense of potential danger on the part of the main users of the straits (USA, USSR, Britain, Japan) whereas China supported this claim as well. The year 1971 also saw the Commonwealth nearly break up (at its summit meeting in Singapore), over the issue of British military cooperation with the Republic of South Africa, at the opposite flank of the Indian Ocean, while the British and Australian heads of government warningly pointed at Soviet warships passing by - coincidence or not - the Singapore conference hall. (Such differing perceptions strongly came back into focus a decade later, under the impact of the Reagan administration's world view.)

The IOPZ, from the beginning, contained a strong element of arms control, regarding both conventional and nuclear armament. According to non-aligned doctrine, the sequence was simple: no foreign bases and navies - regional peace and development. However, even while the proposal was, for the first time, being debated in the UN General Assembly, two important littoral states were at war with each other - India and Pakistan; thus clashed the ideal and the real worlds. Later, the October War of 1973 and the ensu-

ing first energy crisis raised the level of foreign involvement. Africa further contributed to this, mainly between 1974 and 1978. Still, until the great divide of 1978/79 there were chances of a relatively low level of militarization of the Indian Ocean area, mainly due to superpower restraint. In 1977/78, Moscow and Washington tried to negotiate an arms control agreement for the Indian Ocean, which was stalled on account of the Soviet/Cuban Ethiopian campaign and later completely broke down over the new power structure following the Shah of Iran's downfall. For a while, however, these bilateral talks had appeared to be an essential element of a Peace Zone agreement; both the actively engaged littoral states (with India in the fore front) and the USSR have to this day continued to demand resumption of the talks in this connection.

II. A proliferation of peace zone formulas

The seventies saw a proliferation of separate 'peace zone' proposals in the Indian Ocean area, in each case connected with the threat perception of individual states or of groups of states with a similar political orientation, and partly with the wish to impose such orientation on others. The ASEAN countries' ZOPFAN initiative met with an unkind response from Vietnam and Laos at the non-aligned summit in Colombo (1976). However, not much later (1978), Hanoi came up with its own version of transforming South-East Asia into an area of peace and cooperation: the ASEAN states should move towards rapprochement with Indochina (where Cambodia meanwhile had gone astray), on the basis of a Zone of Genuine Independence, Peace and Neutrality (ZOGIPAN). The proposal - in which 'genuine independence' stood for ASEAN distancing itself from the West - was short-lived; it ended with the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia (but has since been renewed in another guise).

There was a similar development in the Red Sea/Horn of Africa area, with two ideologies - Marxism and Islam - poised against each other. In 1977, the Red Sea littoral countries, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the lead, tried to foster a 'zone of peace' with a tendency towards Arab/Islamic dominance in this sensitive area. The USSR and Israel were equally alarmed. Even South Yemen was marginally included while Ethiopia was out. Soon afterwards, the Ogaden war changed the structure, with South Yemen rallying to Ethiopia's side, with an ensuing polarization of regional forces, and with growing outside involvement. In

1981, both South Yemen and Ethiopia demanded a 'peace zone' with basic characteristics of ZOGIPAN, i.e. linked to the socialist 'peace camp' led by Moscow.

At present, it is interesting to watch the development of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with the principalities of the Arabian Gulf littoral and with Saudi Arabia in the centre. This new alliance shows some striking similarities to ASEAN in its formative phase, and it has also used parlance with 'zone of peace' overtones: the Gulf should be kept free from outside interference as a precondition to growing co-operation among and peaceful development of the regional states. The common threat perception focusses on (a) internal unrest which is being fostered by ideologies of leftist or of Islamic content, (b) on disruptive moves from neighbours (South Yemen, Iran) or (c) from farther afield, including, of course, the superpowers.

The Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal has from 1975 onwards made strong use of a 'peace zone' formula solely for itself; this has in fact become an outstanding feature in Kathmandu's foreign policy and has even been introduced into the country's 'Directive Principles' (constitution). The fact that China, Pakistan, Bangla Desh and other regional states have supported the formula whereas India has not, is a pointer to the real meaning of Nepal's demand: to keep equidistance to its two mighty neighbours, China and India, which in effect would signify an end to the 'special relationship', backed by an old treaty, with India.

What all these otherwise widely diverging peace zone schemes have in common, is the desire to ward off undesirable outside influence and, at the same time, to see some recognition of the proposer's own policy aims and ideological guidelines. In some cases it was implied that a certain political approach should be adopted by the prospective peace zone partner, with the result that 'peace' became synonymous with the complete acceptance of a particular political system. In 1980 the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Rajaratnam, had this in mind when he said that the Vietnamese wanted to spread socialism throughout the whole of South-East Asia: "According to their idea of a peace zone you have to accept this fundamental thesis. If you don't accept it, then it is no longer a peace zone ..."[2]. Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister of Vietnam, Mr. Thach, explained that so long as ASEAN countries permitted the military presence of the United States and other Western countries, they had no right to speak of a zone of peace[3].

Such examples show the paradox of ideas which underlie demands for a peace zone. The ASEAN countries fear Vietnam which is vastly superior militarily and they are therefore seeking outside protection or credible security guarantees. Vietnam, on the other hand, is afraid of China and wants a Soviet guarantee of protection against it. Similarly, external powers are being drawn into regional conflicts all around the Indian Ocean. The tangible threats to the security of Indian Ocean littoral states are, as a rule, of a regional nature. In other words, weaker countries are afraid of their neighbours and look for outside protection against them. This type of conflict mostly outweighs fears of direct interventions from outside. Besides, in the face of indirect methods of exerting influence used by great powers - military assistance, including guarantees or refusals to supply weapon systems, political support for opposition groups, etc. - peace zones as defined hitherto cannot achieve anything.

Whilst during the seventies, negotiations on peace zones in the Indian Ocean were taking place, the Cold War increasingly penetrated the region, much more than during earlier decades. Regional conflicts drew in foreign powers which, were it not for such negative reasons, would hardly have obtained or even sought opportunities for exerting influence in such a decisive way. A community of solidarity in the Indian Ocean region might otherwise have become a strong element in the international system. Of this potential only those few efforts at institutionalization remain at present which have begun to have an effect at sub-regional level (ASEAN, the Arab Gulf states).

III. Recent IOPZ diplomacy: East-West divide in a North-South context

Regarding the IOPZ proposal - since the early seventies "a hardy United Nations perennial"[4] -, the paradox became even more glaring. By 1978/79, the annual voting in the General Assembly on the Peace Zone item had led to an overwhelming majority of supporters, mainly the non-aligned movement and the socialist camp. In June 1979, President Carter had agreed with First Secretary Brezhnev in Vienna that bilateral Indian Ocean military reduction talks should be resumed "promptly". This was the last time there was a semblance of similarity between US and Soviet positions on this issue. For exactly at this juncture, the rapid deteriora-

tion of East-West relations correspondingly ushered in a period of increasing tension, globally and particularly in the Indian Ocean area where almost immediately the military presence of both superpowers rose to an unprecedented level. By the end of 1979, there was a real danger that Moscow and Washington would clash directly in or over Iran, and when this did not happen, the Soviets marched into Afghanistan.

The IOPZ diplomatic machinery in the UN, however, worked as if these events had not taken place. The non-aligned pressed for a large conference of all littoral and hinterland states around the Indian Ocean plus all the main maritime users of this ocean, in Colombo, to discuss the various aspects of the IOPZ proposal, in the first instance the military retreat of external powers. With the exception of China (see above), the other permanent members of the UN Security Council had up to this time avoided membership in the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean - each for its own good reasons. The paradox was that in the first half of 1980, one after the other, the USSR, the United States, France and Britain - in order not to be outdone by each other - gave up previous reservations and, together with a sizeable number of other maritime users, including the Federal Republic of Germany, joined that body. By now, the Committee could count on the cooperation of 44 countries. At the same time, however, the chances of any useful outcome to the endeavours of Indian Ocean littoral countries was pushed still further into the background, due to the dramatic increase in conflicts in and around the ocean.

In the summer of 1980, the first sitting of the Committee in its expanded and upgraded form adjourned without results. The main conflict was between the Soviet Union and the United States. While the Soviet Union's main demand was that the United States should vacate Diego Garcia, the United States countered with Afghanistan to the effect that as long as Soviet troops were stationed in a hinterland state of the Indian Ocean, talking about a zone of peace was pointless. A group of nine countries was appointed to expedite preparations for the conference scheduled for July 1981. The composition of the group largely reflected the spectrum of opinion: Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic alongside Canada and Australia, Pakistan and Somalia alongside India and Ethiopia, with Sri Lanka as chairman. The number of committee members increased to forty-five and the level of dissension rose as well.

The key word in these debates was 'trust'. Thus, the French delegate to the Ad Hoc Committee declared that security was dependent on trust but that recently this trust had been damaged in the Indian Ocean region. Like détente, trust, he went on, was indivisible, and countries with global responsibilities (a typically French way of seeing things) were called upon to restore the trust that had been lost. The Pakistani delegate took up this catchword and said that trust was indeed an important element of security and that it was therefore crucial for the creation of a zone of peace that countries in the region should not acquire means of power with which their neighbours could be intimidated[5].

At the beginning of the eighties, there can be no doubt that a lack of trust between the super-powers, between East and West, between the Soviet Union and China, but not least between individual states in the Indian Ocean region, has strongly eroded the zone of peace idea. Confidence-building measures among countries and sub-regions of the Indian Ocean could be initiated, even in the face of prolonged tension between the power blocs in East and West, thus creating at least the preconditions for a peace zone[6]. A British writer made various suggestions which included hot lines between potential adversaries so as to avoid miscalculations, the exchange of military delegations, notification of troop movements, regional courts of arbitration for maritime disputes, and similar ones for the apportioning of resources, exchange of information on armament and on arms imports[7].

Measures such as these, however, unfeasible they may appear at the moment, could certainly constitute an effective way forward towards the creation of a zone of peace, rather than sterile concentration on 'super-power rivalry'. To the latter, the American representative on the Ad Hoc Committee, J. Kahan, observed in July 1980:

"We cannot refute the excellent logic of the distinguished permanent representative of Madagascar who pointed out that such rivalry exists. Although we too deplore it, it is clear how much simpler life would be for the Soviet Union if it had no 'rivals' in the Indian Ocean area"[8].

During the United Nations debate on the Indian Ocean Peace Zone in December 1980, the spokesman for the EEC countries (from Luxembourg) made a joint statement of which the following is a summary: The UN charter was violated in 1980 by serious events connected with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Trust, as the basis of security, has

been severely undermined. The IOPZ concept takes very differing forms. The EEC member states therefore consider that the following principles should apply:

- The United Nations charter gives every country the right to individual and collective self-defence. This right should not be curtailed by an IOPZ.
- The security of the Indian Ocean region depends just as much on the countries in the region as on outside powers. The former should, therefore, first of all sort out among themselves their regional security relations.
- There should be no restrictions on the freedom of the high seas.

On the basis of the above principles, the EEC Member States have adopted the following position:

- The immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan must be a precondition for an IOPZ.
- The threat to stability in the Indian Ocean does not derive principally from naval presence but rather from numerous conflicts producing tension within the region.
- The Ad Hoc Committee should define the geographical limits of an IOPZ, should draw up criteria for defining military presence, and should examine the problem of verification.
- For all these reasons, it is premature to hold a large conference in 1981. The European members of the Committee will continue to cooperate in these matters and will seek to clarify the unresolved questions mentioned above. A conference cannot be envisaged until such time as further developments make it seem worthwhile[9].

As a result of a truly Herculean debating effort, it was at last decided that the conference should be held not later than in the first half of 1983.

IV. The present impasse and a possible way out

By now, a clear three-tier pattern had established itself, with the Soviet Union and its allies at one end of the spectre, the United States and Western countries at the other, and the bulk of the littoral and non-aligned states in the middle. (Whereas there are hardly any nuances of difference recognizable among statements of the first, Soviet-led group, such differences are very apparent with the others.)

The three-tier formation was in evidence in mid-1981 when the Federal Republic of Germany introduced a draft resolution on behalf of "like-minded delegations" (postpone a conference) while Sri Lanka offered another one on behalf of the non-aligned (convene a conference) to which the Soviet bloc acceded albeit with its own line of arguments. In fact, the Soviets - following the tenor of Leonid Brezhnev's address to the 26th party congress - presented their point of view during 1981 in a series of publications, thereby stressing the importance they accorded to the subject[10].

The United States, on the other hand, did not conceal the fact that to them, since 1979, the whole strategic set-up in the Indian Ocean had undergone such a sea-change that old precepts and, in particular, a 1971 vintage Peace Zone resolution and the following mandate to the United Nations, simply no longer corresponded with reality. The USSR as a land power with a vast military - including airlift - potential had come into full view through its occupation of Afghanistan, an hinterland state of the Indian Ocean, and thus it was an absolute necessity for the U.S. not only to maintain its relatively limited military presence in and around the Indian Ocean but to augment and improve it for cases of an acute crisis. This view has been basically shared by other Western nations, but there are different national interests as well as different attitudes towards procedural matters. The Peace Zone debate has developed once more - i.e. after the early seventies - into an East-West divide, with the Soviet Union now trying very hard to keep close to the non-aligned, littoral states.

Their group is also much divided, although it has usually managed to speak with one voice at major events where a Southern stance vis-à-vis the North has been called for. There are "moderates" and "radicals", pro-West and pro-Soviet countries, those which fear their non-aligned neighbour much more than any outsiders or those that hope to step in where extraneous powers would step out. During 1981, Malaysia and Pakistan, among others, tried to mediate between East and West. The Malaysian delegate at the Ad Hoc Committee called both Diego Garcia and the occupation of Afghanistan destabilising, so an IOPZ should come about after three steps: the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the area, settlement of regional disputes by peaceful means only, and no use of force on the part of big powers against regional states[11]. Pakistan advocated a step by step approach towards implementation of an IOPZ, without too many expectations for the beginning, i.e. for the first comprehen-

sive conference. Both the great powers and the regional states would be under the obligation to adhere to principles of a Peace Zone [12].

India, one of the most ardent advocates of the Peace Zone concept, went much further by lauding the Soviet Union for its positive attitude and chiding the United States for its negative stance. In April 1982, there was a mammoth conference in New Delhi, sponsored jointly by the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian Peace and Solidarity Organization and several other notorious pro-Soviet groupings, with 150 foreign and about 1,000 Indian participants; both Prime Minister Gandhi and First Secretary Brezhnev sent messages [13]. The tenor of the conference was fully in line with Soviet policy, condemning the United States for threatening the national independence of Indian Ocean countries, for trying to control their natural resources, etc.

The Reagan administration's frankness regarding its military and strategic aims in the Indian Ocean region (as elsewhere) has indeed invited a Soviet diplomatic offensive which at least partly can count on sympathies by regional countries. The geostrategic advantage of the USSR, i.e. its proximity to Southwest Asia, and to the Persian Gulf in particular, is being accepted as a fact of life while the cumbersome U.S. build-up of facilities in littoral countries and of a Rapid Deployment Force will continue to draw local criticism. The reasons are many; one of them is the Arab/Islamic perception of U.S.-backed Israel as the number one enemy, with the Soviet Union ranking more or less far behind. Constant Soviet repetition of its own readiness for a new round of bilateral military reduction talks with the U.S., covering the Indian Ocean area, meets with the approval of most of the regional states. Against this, the U.S. position has, until very recently, appeared rigid and the tone of U.S. pronouncements has sounded haughty at times. This may be understandable vis-à-vis the prospect for Washington to see Diego Garcia or the Rapid Deployment Force being debated in a huge conference, dominated by the Soviet Union and non-too-friendly, non-aligned states. But it is not very helpful in the given context.

Since very recently, there has been a change of attitude on the part of the US delegation in the Ad Hoc Committee. There is now more flexibility regarding American willingness to cooperate; at the same time Washington insists that the 1971 mandate of the IOPZ must be changed: its main emphasis should no longer be placed on the elimination of foreign navies and military installations, instead a much more com-

prehensive concept should lead to a strengthening of elements of peace in the area. What is required according to the American position - which seems to be supported by other Western delegations - is a code of conduct to which all the regional and the relevant external countries would adhere. Military and security issues would remain in the centre of a new IOPZ mandate, supported, however, by political and economic issues. The latter, in particular, by raising expectations regarding more North-South cooperation for technological, industrial, scientific development, could be an interesting new element for Indian Ocean littoral countries, provided that respective promises could be substantiated. The Reagan administration's attitude regarding aid to the Third World in general, has up to now not favoured such an approach. On the other hand, a number of "moderate" Indian Ocean states might be inclined towards such new proposals, not least because for some of them it would be important to see a stronger neighbour under the obligation to adhere to principles of regional security.

It can be expected that the Soviets will strongly oppose any such change of the original IOPZ mandate as this would also shift the focus away from their prime target, the US military activities in the area. Moscow's position is, as indicated above, clearly outlined and is being supported, in different degrees, by a fair number of littoral states. It seems, therefore, that any Western attempt to substantially alter the previous IOPZ mandate, could only result in a new closing of ranks of the USSR with the non-aligned. Progress towards a modified mandate which basically appears to be a sound proposition, could only be achieved gradually. As yet, there is thus no exit from the impasse of the East-West-South entanglement over an IOPZ, but the direction has been indicated in which it might lie.

V. Some conclusions from a German viewpoint

The Federal Republic of Germany is less dependent on goods from and exchange with Indian Ocean littoral countries than other Western countries, including Japan. But one of its political leitmotifs has for some time been the fostering of resilience of Third World countries against big power pressure, if possible by means of regional economic and political cooperation. (In this respect, ASEAN has been the model in Asia.) Thus, elements of an IOPZ have been welcomed, and both the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese hold over Cambodia have been condemned in such a

context. In a German view, military and strategic aspects of the Indian Ocean are of a high significance, indeed, but the West should not lose sight of other burning issues which could lead to conflict and conflagration in that area, mainly of a social and economic nature. 'Stability' is a many-faceted issue in basically instable developing countries. In view of growing inter-dependence, North-South cooperation will be of increasing importance, although such cooperation will require constant rethinking and modifying. Bonn, therefore, is against a confrontationist policy vis-à-vis the Third World, wherever this can be avoided without sacrificing vital interests. Insofar as the object of an IOPZ is not a Soviet propaganda ploy but contains a potential for confidence building both among the countries in the region and between them and external powers, Germany would be prepared to go along and to give it a try. There is a parallel to détente policy which in the German view, too, is not simply something that was tried and has failed but is a drawn-out and often exasperating process to which there is no peaceful alternative.

The IOPZ - to the extent also that it is not an utopian scheme for 'driving out' major powers from an ocean that does, after all, not belong to littoral states - will see some progress only if and when the present confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR would lessen. Only then would both be willing to accord less priority to their military presence in or near that area[14]. The Indian Ocean will, however, never become an idyllic lake of peace. It never was one in the past which is being conveniently forgotten by people who think only in simplistic terms of foreign devils responsible for all their ills. Even the two superpowers can not exercise control over the Indian Ocean region, neither a pax sovietica nor a pax americana would stand the slightest chance of being imposed there. The very idea of an exclusive influence of one or the other outside power is absurd in view of the multi-faceted, problem-ridden, colourful realities of an area where nearly one third of mankind lives.

The superpowers and, for that matter, all other outside powers, can make it more difficult for regional countries to coexist peacefully because, as stated above, their involvement tends to exacerbate conflicting situations. But to create, instead of an all-embracing Peace Zone, limited areas of peace where cooperation will replace conflict, lies in the first instance within the responsibility and the realm of possibility of the regional countries concerned - there should be no excuses. This will be more difficult in some

areas than in others (e.g. for India, with its size, it will always be a problem to find a balance for coexisting with its smaller neighbours) but the future will demand increasing cooperation on a subregional level, among countries with common problems and often with common tradition and experience on which to build. They should find avenues towards associating, with various degrees of institutionalization, and thus towards a vested interest in peaceful development. To cite just one obvious example: in Asia there is the challenge of huge river systems, such as the Mekong or the Ganges, which most urgently need to be harnessed and made use of for the benefit of their riparian population, in a common, regional effort. Undiluted nationalism is an obstacle for development.

As a rule, nation-states, however recent in existence, loath to give up sovereign rights (vide the not too bright example of the European Community), and old enmities will linger underneath the surface of many an alliance. Still, the logic of the historical process - after many energies of "the North" versus "the South" have over the years and mutually been spent - seems to point in the direction of regional cooperation, association and thus, hopefully, towards increasing areas of peace.

Notes

- 1 cf. J.Nehru, India's Foreign Policy - Selected Speeches, New Delhi 1961, p.67.
- 2 Summary of World Broadcast (BBC) FE/6509/A3/1, 29.8.1980.
- 3 Far Eastern Economic Review, 6.2.1981, p.8f.
- 4 P.Towle, The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean: Blind Alley or Zone of Peace?, in: Bowman/Clark (eds.), The Indian Ocean in Global Politics, Boulder/Colorado 1981, p.207.
- 5 cf. Indian Ocean Committee, 109th Meeting, 30.7.1980, UN Department of Public Information, Press Section, New York, p.2f.
- 6 For years the Federal Republic of Germany had made this a leitmotif both inside and outside the United Nations, not least in view of conflicts in the Indian Ocean region.
- 7 cf. Towle, op.cit., p.218f.
- 8 United States Wireless Bulletin, 5.8.1980, p.14.

- 9 A/35/PV.94, 15.12.1980.
- 10 cf. A.Alexeyev/A.Fialkovsky, For a Peaceful Indian Ocean, International Affairs (Moscow), February 1981; S.Vladimorov, For a Zone of Peace, New Times, No.8/1981; S.Vladimirov, An Important Conference, New Times No.22/1981; A.Ladoshsky, The USSR's efforts to turn the Indian Ocean into a Zone of Peace, International Affairs (Moscow), August 1981.
- 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, 3.7.1981, p.26f.
- 12 Dawn (Karachi), 7.3.1981, p.7.
- 13 Times of India, 26.4.1982; Link (New Delhi), 2.5.1982.
- 14 One important step in this direction would be mutually acceptable surveillance and verification procedures, mainly by the use of satellites.